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Abstract: 
Cross-sectional wage regressions overstate the extent to which earnings increase with job 
seniority because they fail to take account of the sorting which occurs when high wage workers 
have lower rates of mobility. The main source of bias is a negative correlation between turnover 
probabilities and (unobserved) market valued individual characteristics which are transferable 
across firms. These results argue for the importance of theories which emphasize generally 
applicable individual differences and against those which focus on firm-specific attributes. 
 
Article: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Upwards sloping earnings profiles are a primary feature of most labor market theories. Wages 
rise with seniority in the human capital model (Becker, 1975), since job tenure is correlated with 
acquisitions of firm- specific skills, as well as in a number of more recently developed 
explanations. Lazear (1981) argues that rising wage profiles represent a bond which shirking 
workers risk losing. Similarly, deferred compensation reduces adverse selection in the testing 
models of Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1982) and might also insure against breach of implicit 
contracts in periods of above average demand. 
 
These theories require wages to increase with job duration and draw support from the stylized 
results obtained from cross-sectional earnings regressions. However, such findings need not 
imply that compensation increases with seniority. Alternatively, high paying jobs could last 
longer than other employment. Sorting is then likely to result in cross-sectional wage regressions 
which overstate seniority earnings differentials. 
 
There is good reason to expect an inverse relationship between wages and turnover rates. The 
matching models of Burdett (1978) and Jovanovic (1979) predict high pay and low mobility in 
jobs providing good "matches" and low earnings and higher turnover when the match is poor. 
Voluntary mobility may also be reduced in efficiency wages models, where firms pay high 
wages to raise effort and reduce turnover.
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 The relationship will be more pronounced if, in the 
presence of training or turnover costs, employers offer premiums to workers with low quit 
propensities. In each case, sorting will create a positive correlation between wages and seniority. 
 
Recent empirical work confirms that tenure coefficients in cross-sectional wage regressions are 
seriously biased. Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) find that partial controls for previous mobility 
 
1.  See Yellen (1984) for a survey of this literature. 
 
reduce the estimated returns to tenure by up to 40%. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), using an 
instrumental variable technique measuring the difference between current and average tenure 
within a given job, show an almost 80% reduction in seniority wage premiums and Abraham and 
Farber (1987) find a similar decrease when the estimated completed duration of jobs is included 
in cross-sectional wage regressions.
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This paper investigates whether seniority premiums observed in cross-sectional data result from 
job-specific attributes or from a sorting process where superior workers simultaneously receive 
high wages and have low rates of turnover. It does so by examining whether involuntarily 
terminated employees are able to carry preseparation seniority differentials to their next job.
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 To 
the extent the premiums are transferred, they represent attributes valued by a number of 
employers. Conversely, if firm-specific attachments are of greater importance, previous job 
duration should be uncorrelated (or weakly correlated) with future wages. 
 
Regardless of work history, most displaced individuals are required to search for new 
employment while jobless. Controlling for characteristics observable by potential employers, we 
therefore expect them to receive approximately the same distribution of new and wage and job 
offers. Unlike economically motivated quits, there is little reason for persons with good previous 
job matches to obtain better than average matches in their first post-layoff employment.
4
 
 
II. SENIORITY AND WAGES 
Standard cross-sectional earnings regressions take the form 
  
Wj,t = Bsj,t + ej,t’     
 
where the subscripts t and j refer to the time period and job, s represents seniority (with all other 
observable characteristics suppressed to clarify exposition), and e is the regression error term. 
The disturbance term can be decomposed into an individual effect (f) which influences wages 
and is transferable across employers, a job-specific match effect (mj), and a white noise error  
(uj,t). Thus ej,t = f + mj + uj,t. 
 
The seniority coefficient estimated from (1) will be unbiased only if tenure is uncorrelated with 
both match and individual quality (E(f|s) = E(m|s) = 0). Conversely, if expected values of either 
variable increase with job duration, the seniority coefficient will be upwards biased. To see this 
let ϕ  and ω  indicate the expected value functions of f and m. In the simple case where E(f 
|s) = ϕ(s) = ϕs and E(m|s) = ω(s) = ωs,  = + ϕ+ ω. Since ϕ and ω may vary across firms, the 
bias in the regression coefficient captures an average of the aggregated firm effects. Employers  
 
2. Lang (1987) criticizes this research. 
3. Kletzer (1989) has recently used information on permanently terminated workers from the 
Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population Survey to investigate some of the questions 
focused upon in this paper. 
4.
 
A weak relationship may persist to the extent that longer tenure workers receive longer 
prenotification of layoffs or greater reemployment assistance. 
 
(1) 
frequently terminating workers may have different expectation functions from those with low 
rates of turnover, thus the cross-sectional (pre-displacement) seniority premiums of laidoff 
workers may differ from those of job stayers. 
 
Next consider individuals in their first employment following a permanent layoff. Using the 
subscripts r and p to denote the pre- and post-separation job, respectively, and suppressing the 
time subscript, post displacement wages are 
 
wp =Bsp + f +mP +uP. 
 
Since E(f |sr) = ϕ(sr), provides an unbiased estimate of 4, in regressions of 
 
wp =Bsp + Csr +eP,                                                                                                      (2) 
 
if eP is uncorrelated with sr. This condition is fulfilled if mP and up are orthogonal to sr, in which 
case  indicates the extent to which market valued transferable characteristics are associated 
with previous tenure. If seniority differentials resulted exclusively from firm-specific 
acquisitions,  would equal zero. 
 
up is a random disturbance and is therefore uncorrelated with prior seniority. Postseparation 
match quality will be positively correlated with previous tenure following voluntary turnover, 
however, since workers quit jobs (for economic reasons) only when superior offers are received. 
To reduce this correlation, I focus on involuntarily displaced employees, whose reemployment 
(and match quality) will be more random. 
 
Even if matches occur randomly following permanent layoffs, some workers procure good 
matches (and high wages) and so will have relatively low subsequent turnover rates. Persons 
with highly valued transferable attributes may also be relatively immobile and obtain substantial 
seniority on the new job. As a result, both m and f will be positively correlated with sp causing an 
upwards bias in . 
 
Unbiased estimates of  can be obtained by replacing current seniority with an instrumental 
variable which is correlated with tenure but orthogonal to match and individual quality. I use an 
instrument (sp*) which measures the deviation between current job duration (sp) and average 
within-job seniority (rip).
5
 This instrumental variable was developed and first used by Altonji 
and Shakotko (1987). Because it measures changes in seniority within a given job, both match 
and individual quality are held constant by definition. sp* is therefore uncorrelated with the 
regression error term and  and , respectively, show the true returns to seniority and to 
transferable market valued individual characteristics which are correlated with previous tenure. 
 
5. Thus, sp* = sp — p. For example, if the post-layoff job continues for five survey periods, 
average within job tenure is 2.5 years and the value of the instrument in years one through five 
respectively is — 2, —1, 0, 1, and 2. Similar instruments can be constructed for other forms of the tenure 
variable. For example( )*=  — ( ). 
 
 
Care is needed in generalizing the results described below because the seniority profiles of 
involuntary job leavers may differ from those of immobile workers. For example, layoffs may be 
concentrated among individuals with relatively poor matches and small investments in specific 
human capital, leading to relatively flat pre- separation wage profiles. This concern is partially 
mitigated by evidence that the seniority differentials of displaced workers are actually steeper 
than for their job stayer counterparts. 
 
III. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This paper analyzes data on male heads of households from the 1969-1980 waves of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
6 
Pooled data are used for individuals employed on their first 
jobs subsequent to involuntary (permanent) layoffs occurring between 1969 and 1975. Persons 
over the age of 55 or under 21, at the time of displacement, are excluded from the sample, as are 
those remaining out of the labor force for all of the 2 years following the calendar year of the 
termination. This sample includes 1373 individuals and 5559 person-year observations. For 
comparison purposes, a sample containing both laid-off and non-displaced workers was also 
constructed from pooled 1969-1975 data. 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of real weekly wages. Most regressors are specified in 
fairly standard ways. Data for actual work experience became available in 1974. For earlier 
years, experience was calculated as 1974 experience plus the difference between the survey year 
and 1974 (and bounded to be non-negative). Because seniority is available only as a categorical 
variable prior to 1976, dummy variables were created for 5 tenure groups—less than 1, 1 to 3, 3 
to 9, 10 to 19, and 20 or more years seniority. Layoffs are classified as permanent if the worker 
fails to return to the original employer within 2 calendar years. The standard two stage 
"Heckman correction" for reemployment selection bias was used to provide consistent estimates 
in the post-separation wage regressions.
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Selected sample means are presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 1. Displaced males are 
younger, less experienced, less educated and have lower tenure than their full sample 
counterparts. They are more likely to be nonwhite or unmarried, more frequently work in blue 
collar jobs (72.1 vs. 54.4%) and receive lower weekly wages ($141 vs. $185) than the full 
sample: Post-separation earnings are approximately 16% higher than pre-layoff wages. This does 
not imply that involuntary terminations raise wages, however, since the compensation of other 
workers may be growing at a faster rate.
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Columns (3) and (4) show the results of period zero (preseparation) earnings regressions for the 
full sample and subsample of workers displaced in year one. The coefficients TEN2 through  
 
6.  Women are excluded because of the small number in the survey and because the process 
generating tenure premiums is likely to be substantially different than for men. Future work focusing on 
females is needed. 
7. See Heckman (1979) for details. Wage observations are missing, due to sustained 
unemployment, for 8.8% (535 out of 6095) of the sample. The regressions were also estimated without 
correcting for selection bias. This did not lead to important changes in the coefficients of interest. 
8. Recent work examining the wage consequences of mobility (i.e. Mincer 1986, Ruhm 1987a) 
finds greater gains following quits than layoffs and, controlling for the reason for turnover, for low than 
high tenure workers. Ruhm also uncovers important gender differences. 
TENS in column (3) indicate seniority differentials of job stayers. Wage premiums, over new job 
entrants, range from 10.7%, for workers with 1 to 3 years tenure, to a maximum of 20.7% after 
10 to 19 years seniority. 
 
LA Y1 through LAYS show how the preseparation wages of displaced workers compare to those 
of job stayers with equivalent seniority. The negative coefficients indicate lower pay. While the 
shortfalls are statistically significant and range between 10% and 13% for persons with less than 
a decade on the job, no significant differences exist for individuals with 10 or more years tenure. 
This suggests that firms initially use layoffs to eliminate less desirable workers, with senior 
employees being terminated more randomly. It also implies that period zero tenure profiles will 
be steeper for involuntary job leavers than for other workers. This can be seen by comparing the 
coefficients TEN2 through TENS in column (4) with their counterparts in column (3). The 
maximum seniority premium is 20.7% for job stayers but almost 27% in the layoff subsample. 
 
Columns (5) and (6) present estimates of the post-layoff wage regressions. TEN2 through TENS 
indicate the correlation between pre-displacement seniority and post-displacement earnings and 
show the extent to which preseparation tenure premiums result from low turnover rates among 
persons with transferable market valued characteristics. DUR and DURSQ indicate how wages 
change with seniority in the immediately following employment. The coefficients in column (5) 
apply to instrumental variables measuring within- job deviations in seniority and are of primary 
interest. For comparison purposes, column (6) presents estimates of OLS regressions using actual 
post-separation tenure. If the post- separation seniority variable is of reasonably good quality and 
differences in unobserved job match or individual quality remain, after controlling for 
predisplacement seniority, we expect the OLS tenure coefficients to exceed the IV estimates.  
 
Seniority premiums obtained prior to displacement continue onto the first subsequent job. Those 
with 1 to 19 years tenure actually earn a larger differential following the layoff than before it. For 
example, the 10 to 19 year group earns 27.4% more than to new job entrants and 16.8% greater 
than the 1 to 3 year category, prior to mobility, but 44.5% and 28.4% premiums, respectively, on 
the first post-displacement job. Seniority differentials transfer less completely for the longest 
tenure category —they earn 26% more than the less than 1 year group before the layoff but only 
14% greater after it. 
 
These results suggest that virtually the entire cross- sectional return to seniority (for workers with 
less than 20 years on the job) is explained by low turnover among individuals with market valued 
transferable characteristics. This interpretation receives further support from the small returns to 
post-layoff seniority in the instrumental variable regressions described in column (5). According 
to these estimates, earnings growth during the first 5 years on the post-displacement job averages 
only 2.5%. By contrast, the premium is a much larger 25.7% when actual postseparation tenure, 
rather than the within job instrument, is used (see column (6)). This indicates important 
unobserved differences in job or individual quality, even when prior seniority is controlled for. 
 
Wage regressions were also estimated for subsamples stratified by ethnic status (white vs. 
nonwhite), industry (manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing), and occupation (blue collar vs. 
professional, managerial, and technical). Space does not permit a full discussion of the results, 
however, two findings are worth noting.
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 First, wage profiles are far steeper for professional, 
 
9. A table showing full regression results is available from the author.  
 
managerial, and technical employees than for other workers. Where the estimated return to 5 
years seniority is only around 2% for the entire sample and is zero or negative for blue collar 
occupations, it is approximately 33% for professionals. This result is consistent with recent 
research by Davis (1987) indicating much faster within-job earnings increases for managers than 
for other occupations. Second, there is some evidence of ethnic group differences in earnings 
profiles. The coefficients on the instrumented tenure variables are negative and statistically 
insignificant for nonwhites, whereas the estimated wage gain for staying 5 years on the first post-
displacement job exceeds 9% for whites. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cross-sectional estimates of within-job earnings growth are strongly biased by a positive 
correlation between the regression error term and job seniority. This occurs mainly because 
individuals with high tenure possess market valued attributes which are transferable across firms. 
Differences in match quality appear much less important. 
 
Using an instrumental variable measuring deviations between current and average within job 
tenure, there is virtually no reward for seniority on the first employment held after a permanent 
layoff. Conversely, the preseparation seniority differentials of persons leaving jobs of up to 20 
years duration are retained (and frequently increased) upon reemployment. Individuals with still 
longer tenure appear more vulnerable to loss of seniority premiums following displacement. 
 
For male head of households, the estimated return to five years seniority falls from 22.5% to 
2.5% when match and individual quality are controlled for. The reductions for whites are slightly 
smaller—from 29.8% to 9.4%. Therefore, only 10% to 25% of cross-sectional tenure premiums 
represent actual within-job earnings increases. Other recent research yields similar results. 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) find that the actual return to tenure, for white males, is only 9% to 
30% as large as that indicated by cross-sectional estimates. Abraham and Farber (1987) argue 
that the corrected estimate (also for white males) is between one-fifth and one-third as large as in 
cross-sectional data. 
 
These results question the importance of theories which emphasize match quality or firm-specific 
endowments. On the other hand, models which emphasize transferable (unobserved) worker 
traits probably deserve greater attention. It is not clear which specific characteristics are valued 
across firms. Related work (Ruhm, 1987b) suggests that heterogeneity in quit propensities may 
be of considerable importance. These findings should not be taken to imply that worker-firm 
attachments are never consequential. For example, managerial and professional workers gain 
considerable rewards for remaining with a single employer. 
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